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Allied Special Forces and Prisoner of War Recovery 
Operations in Europe, 1944–1945*

Neville Wylie
The importance of safely recovering servicemen from the hands of their enemies has become one of the central elements of the modern state’s 
“contract” with its serving personnel. If servicemen and women are to give their 
all in combat, and hold to a high standard of conduct after capture, the state, for 
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Abstract
This article investigates the efforts made to protect prisoners of war 
(POWs) in German hands at the end of the Second World War. Chal-
lenging contemporary and historical judgments, it argues that Allied 
plans were reasonable, realistic, and reflected a widespread belief in 
the importance of protecting the lives and well-being of Allied POWs. 
Although only two operations were ultimately mounted, the process of 
raising and equipping specialized recovery units provided a valuable 
learning experience for Allied planners, which later went on inform re-
covery operations in the Pacific, and set a precedent that arguably ex-
tends to influence attitudes towards POW recovery today.
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its part, has the responsibility to ensure that no stone is left unturned in securing 
their release and repatriation. Such views lay behind the ninety missions launched 
to liberate U.S. personnel from captivity in North Vietnam between 1966 and 
1970; they fuelled the emergence of the powerful prisoner of war/missing in action 
(POW/MIA) lobby in the United States, and have provided a recurrent theme 
for screen-writers and movie-makers ever since. Recent conflicts have provided 
spectacular examples of such operations, from the Israeli raid on Entebbe in July 
1976, to the “saving of Private [ Jessica] Lynch” in the 2003 Iraq War, to Russia’s 
recent recovery of navigator Konstantin Murakhtin in Syria in November 2015. 
Although operations of this nature always entail a high risk, the political pressure 
on governments to recover their nationals is frequently strong, especially in states 
such as the United States and Israel, where the credo “leave no man behind” is 
deeply etched into the military culture and society at large. Despite a litany of 
painful failures—from Son Tay in November 1970, to the  Tehran hostage rescue 
mission in April 1980—the United States remains committed to recovering its 
servicemen, dead or alive. At the close of the 1991 Gulf War, efforts to tackle 
Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons’ program jostled for priority in the 
Coalition with Washington’s determination to locate Lieutenant Commander 
Michael Speicher, who had been missing since the early days of the conflict.1 Two 
decades on, Washington ignored its injunction against negotiating with terrorists 
and exchanged five senior Taleban fighters for Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, despite 
doubts over the circumstances of Bergdahl’s capture. 
If POW rescue operations have become part and parcel of our understanding 
of contemporary warfare, the same cannot be said for the period before 1945. 
Apart from a handful of successful operations in the Philippines in early 1945, 
large-scale “prisoner recovery” missions have left little imprint in the literature.2 
The details, for instance, of George Patton’s ill-fated attempt to liberate Oflag 
XIIIC, Hammelburg, in mid-March 1945, which saw the relief convoy annihilated 
on its return to Allied lines, remain largely unknown.3 Belligerents were ready 
to help their men escape from captivity or make their way home from neutral 
countries, but with the exception of a handful of celebrated individual rescue 
attempts—such as those of Benito Mussolini or Raymond Aubrac—organized 
1. Private information. The matter was closed only after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. His 
remains were located after exhaustive investigations in 2009.
2. In January 513 POWs were liberated from Cabanatuan camp, and the next month, 2,122 
civilian internees from Los Baños. See William B. Breuer, The Great Raid on Cabanatuan. Rescu-
ing the Doomed Ghosts of Bataan and Corregidor (New York: Wiley, 1994); Hampton Sides, Ghost 
Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War II’s Most Dramatic Mission (New York: Doubleday, 
2001); Lt. Gen. E. M. Flanagan, Angels at Dawn: The Los Baños Raid (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 
1999); and Arnold Arthur, Deliverance at Los Baños (New York: St. Martin’s, 1985).
3. Only 30 of the 500 liberated POWs reached Allied lines. See Richard Baron, Major 
Abe Baum, and Richard Goldhurst, Raid! The Untold Story of Patton’s Secret Mission (New York: 
Putnam, 1981); and Charles Whiting, 48 Hours to Hammelburg: The Story of Patton’s Bloodiest 
Mission (New York: PBJ Books, 1970).  
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“prisoner recovery” operations were rare.4 The dearth of such operations should 
not, however, imply a disinterest in securing the liberty of POWs through military 
means. This paper examines the intense discussions on this theme that took place 
in Allied circles over the last twelve months of the Second World War in Europe. 
These discussions not only explored diplomatic options and questions of relief, 
but also included consideration of the prisoners’ physical protection during the 
final weeks, days, and even hours of the Nazi regime. Though a host of practical 
and political obstacles made the prospect of mounting successful military rescue 
missions daunting, this did not deter Allied planners from their task, or diminish 
the sense of moral responsibility British and American officials felt towards their 
compatriots in enemy captivity. No more than a handful of rescue operations were 
ultimately launched, but the experience in Europe provided an important testing 
ground for this area of activity; they gave rise to the first specialist units dedicated 
to POW recovery, and laid the foundations for the recovery operations in the Far 
East three months later and, arguably, those that followed. 
Emerging Ideas on the Repatriation of POWs at the Close of Hostilities, 1943–1944
British and American thinking over the fate of their prisoners in 1945 was 
framed by a determination to avoid the errors made at the end of the Great War. 
Although the armistice in November 1918 ensured a relatively orderly end to 
armed hostilities, the Entente failed to locate and repatriate their men in a timely 
fashion. Frustrated by the inertia of their governments, numerous prisoners 
simply abandoned their camps and joined the throng of refugees drifting across 
the continent in search of their homes and loved ones. The chaos that ensued 
brought needless hardship to the prisoners concerned, and laid governments open 
to charges of indifference that were difficult to refute.5 Planners in the 1940s 
consequently viewed POW repatriation as an administrative question of how to 
maintain a level of control over their men sufficient to meet their immediate 
food, clothing, and health needs and arrange for their transportation home. This 
task was, however, complicated by the waxing population of displaced people, 
wrought by years of war and alien occupation. By early 1944, predictions as to 
the situation likely to confront Allied forces at the war’s close envisaged a “mass 
uprising” of peoples, with migrants facing “appalling problems of obtaining food 
and shelter on their way [home], probably aggravated by widespread strikes, 
disease, and rioting. Barracks and prison camps will be destroyed and there will be 
sporadic fighting over many areas.”6 Faced with such a prospect, Allied planners 
4. M. R. D. Foot and J. M. Langley, MI9. Escape and Evasion, 1939–1945 (London: Book 
Club, 1979); Lucie Aubrac, Outwitting the Gestapo (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); 
Lloyd R. Shoemaker, The Escape Factory (New York: St. Martin’s, 1990).
5. See Heather Jones, Violence against Prisoners of War in the First World War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 286–91. 
6. Plan for Psychological Warfare against Foreign Workers in Germany, in connection with 
“Overlord” Appendix D, by SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division, 31 May 1944, FO898/340, 
The National Archives (TNA), United Kingdom.
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7. Swiss camp inspectors believed this to be the wisest policy. See memo by Col. R. Sutton 
Pratt (military attaché, Stockholm), 13 September 1944, WO2018/3441, TNA. On the Italian 
debacle, see Roger Absalom, Strange Alliance: Aspects of Escape and Survival in Italy, 1943–45 
(Florence: Casa Editrice Leo S. Olschki, 1991); Adrian Gilbert, POW: Allied Prisoners in Europe, 
1939–1945 (London: John Murray, 2006), 279–96. 
8. For the evolution of Allied policy, see Arieh Kochavi, Confronting Captivity. Britain and 
the United States and their POWs in Nazi Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2005), 171–89; and Neville Wylie, Barbed Wire Diplomacy. Britain, Germany and the Politics 
of Prisoners of War, 1939–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 179–85, 213–64.
9. For D-Day killings, see Howard Margolian, Conduct Unbecoming. The story of the murder 
of Canadian Prisoners of War in Normandy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).
concluded that prisoners should be instructed to remain in their camps, under the 
authority of their senior officers or representatives, and await the arrival of Allied 
relief columns. Although the “stay put” policy caused embarrassment in the fall of 
1943, when, in obeying instructions, some 50,000 Allied POWs in Italy missed 
the chance to escape and merely exchanged Italian guards for German ones, the 
absence of any realistic alternative meant that the instructions—now rebranded 
as the “stand fast” order—remained the central tenet of Allied thinking towards 
POW recovery in Germany at the war’s end.7
Viewing POW recovery as a logistical issue also reflected Allied confidence 
in Germany’s willingness to abide by the 1929 Geneva Convention in its dealings 
with western POWs. Notwithstanding the obvious brutality of Adolf Hitler’s 
regime, and concerns over the working conditions in German mines and the scale 
of camp rations, British and American POWs had been relatively well treated 
during the first three years of the war. Confidence sharply declined over the winter 
of 1943–44, when camp inspection reports began to indicate a marked increase 
in the use of firearms by camp guards and foremen. The ominous trend reflected 
strains in the German war economy and the difficulty of managing an increasingly 
truculent work force, but also pointed to an increasingly permissive attitude 
towards the use of force amongst the German security forces. Events the following 
year lent weight to such fears.8 In May 1944, the Reich’s propaganda minister, 
Joseph Goebbels, gave vent to his frustration at Allied bombing by encouraging 
German civilians to lynch Allied aircrew who fell into their hands. The same 
month London received confirmation of the murder of fifty prisoners who had 
broken out of Stalag Luft III on the night of 24 March. The gruesome incident 
appeared to signal a worrying shift in the balance of power inside Germany, with 
the regular armed forces losing ground to the Schutzstaffel (SS) and Gestapo. 
Heinrich Himmler’s elevation in the Nazi hierarchy following the attempt on 
Hitler’s life on 20 July inevitably strengthened these concerns, as did the spate 
of prisoner killings behind German lines in Normandy and the appointment in 
November of an SS general, Gottlieb Berger, as head of the POW camp system.9
When, therefore, Allied planners turned their attention over the summer of 
1944 to POW repatriation at the close of hostilities, the question they wrestled 
with was not, as before, an administrative one, of how to extricate a quarter of a 
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10. JIC (44) 322 revised, 29 July 1944, Entry 7, Box 73, Record Group (RG) 331, National 
Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, U.S.A. (NARA). This view was 
shared in the Foreign Office; the War Office was more skeptical. Phillimore (War Office) to 
Roberts (Foreign Office), 14 August 1944, FO916/871, TNA.
11. Delivery of Aid of Food and Medical Supplies to Allied POW post-hostilities, by SHAEF G4 
Division, 17 August 1944, AIR2/5638, TNA.
12. General Form of German Collapse, JIC (44) 349 Final, 10 August 1944, M1642 Roll 14, 
RG 226, NARA. Author’s emphasis.
13. Minute by N. Crockatt (MI9), 5 October 1944, WO32/1124, TNA.
million exhausted prisoners from the ruins of Hitler’s Reich, but rather a security 
one: what could be done to protect Allied POWs from revenge attacks as the 
Nazi regime went through its last death throes? The view of the British Joint 
Intelligence Committee ( JIC), to whom the matter was put in July 1944, was 
relatively sanguine. The committee reaffirmed the belief that the German army 
“broadly speaking” adhered to the Geneva Convention and “disapproved of the 
shooting of the RAF [Royal Air Force] escapers.”10 The fate of Allied prisoners 
would depend, however, on who controlled Allied POWs in the final days of 
the war—the German military, die-hard Nazis, or moderate elements within 
the German regime, SS, or Gestapo—and what form Germany’s “defeat” would 
actually take. On both issues, opinions varied widely. Most officials assumed 
that the so-called “Eclipse” period—the war’s end-phase resulting in the final 
extinguishing of Hitler’s power—would consist of the defeat of German land 
forces on the battlefield, followed by an internal collapse of the country’s central 
government. But what this meant in practice was unclear. A study conducted 
by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in mid-
August assumed that the residual German authorities would seek to fulfill 
their obligations, but would probably succeed in meeting only 60 percent of the 
prisoners’ food and medical needs.11 A JIC paper composed at the same time 
talked of the probability of there being “no authority exerting effective control 
over the country from which unconditional surrender could be accepted.”12 
Comparatively little thought, though, was given to the conditions that might 
arise where a total German collapse did not occur and where Allied armies 
would be required to fight their way into every corner of the country.13
Where opinions did converge was on the critical importance of making 
adequate preparations to deal with the possibility, however remote, of a last-
minute massacre of Allied prisoners. Indeed, one of the striking features of 
the discussions was the strength of opinion behind the need to protect Allied 
POWs, and the absence of any sustained criticism of Allied prisoners in allowing 
themselves to be captured in the first place. The British Army Council, which 
had fixated over the problem of “premature surrender” during the First World 
War, now freely admitted that “few questions arouse stronger feeling throughout 
the British Commonwealth than the treatment and welfare of our prisoners of 
war.” Politicians were careful to avoid exciting unwanted attention to the issue, 
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14. Lord Vansittart to Brendan Bracken (Minister of Information), 15 December 1944, 
FO898/328, TNA. 
15. The evacuation of Allied POWs from Germany, AF COPC/S 2050, 31 August 1944, 
AIR2/5638, TNA. Foot and Langley, MI9, 289–90, 291. MI9 was tasked with identifying and 
interrogating POWs suspected of collaboration. 
16. See Venables (SHAEF) to War Office, 22 January 1945, and Table to show dispatch and 
acknowledgement, by MI9, 5 February 1945, indicating no contacts with twenty-seven major 
camps by early February. Entry 7, Box 75, RG 331, NARA.
but did not hesitate to press their concerns on the government.14 The weight of 
moral responsibility bearing on Allied planners is evident in a paper produced 
on the last day of August by the body responsible for coordinating British and 
U.S. air operations. The “first consideration” of the Allied powers after Germany’s 
military defeat, the paper noted, “should be the repatriation of their nationals 
who have had the misfortune to be prisoners of war and who are thus not in a 
position to help themselves.” “To deny to our POW the use of these facilities to 
accomplish their immediate repatriation,” it went on, “would be inconsistent with 
civilized standards of humanity. The hardships, suffering and even deaths of large 
numbers of prisoners of war in Germany, which would be inevitable if they were 
to be left until the occupation of the country is accomplished, would constitute an 
unforgivable indictment which could never be erased.”15 
Initial Planning, June 1944 to March 1945
Mindful of these obligations, the JIC recommended that planning focus on 
three principal areas. First, it was vital that secure communications be established 
with the POWs to ensure that Allied forces could evaluate and react to changes in 
the prisoners’ circumstances. Though simple in theory, the practical difficulties had 
proved exceptionally difficult to overcome, and remained so until the final days of 
the war. By October 1944, MI9, the British escape and evasion service, had radio 
and letter contact with “the bulk” of camps holding British officers and airmen, 
but of the eleven Stalags holding other rank prisoners and known to possess 
radio receivers, only three had acknowledged receipt of communications by that 
date, and the collapse of postal services to the camps over the latter half of 1944 
inevitably reduced the effectiveness of coded letters. Moreover, of the “other rank” 
POWs, only one in eight was detained in camp at any one time: the rest were held 
in work-detachments located upwards of several hundred miles from the main 
base camps. Thus, even before the wholesale evacuation of POW camps in Poland 
and eastern Germany began in early 1945, the problem of communicating with 
western POWs had not been resolved, and concern on this point remained a key 
constraint on Allied options as the war edged to its conclusion.16
The second recommendation, which eventually became the central plank 
of Allied policy, entailed threatening the German authorities with post-war 
retribution should they fail to protect the well-being of Allied POWs under 
their control. The approach had the benefit of not depending on the existence 
of a functioning government in Berlin, but its political problems were manifold. 
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17. See minute by Air Commodore Groves (Political Warfare Executive), 22 December 
1944, FO898/328, TNA.
18. See minute by Anthony Eden (Foreign Secretary) for W. S. Churchill (Prime Minister), 
5 March 1945, FO954 Roll 22, TNA.
As Britain’s Political Warfare Executive never tired of pointing out, the mere 
broadcasting of such warnings would inevitably publicize Allied anxieties that 
might in turn be exploited by the Nazi regime for their own political or tactical 
ends.17 Equally worrying, however, was the potential strain on relations with other 
Allied nations. Moscow was known to harbor grave misgivings over any contacts 
with the German regime, lest they be used to convey peace-feelers from the West. 
The French and Poles, for their part, questioned the priority given to American 
and British POWs over the interests of other Allied nationals—military and 
civilian—in German hands.18 
Charting the proposal through the various inter-governmental processes 
without exciting Soviet opposition or resentment from the junior allies took 
considerable time, and by the end of 1944, little progress had been achieved. 
Pressure mounted to draw a response from the Soviets, and when, in mid-March 
1945, Joseph Stalin came out definitively against a joint warning, the western 
governments were left with either abandoning the project, or going it alone. It is 
a measure of the depth of British and American anxieties over the fate of their 
men—and perhaps too, the dearth of any realistic alternatives—that the two 
governments decided to ignore Soviet sensitivities and instruct General Dwight 
Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of Allied forces in western Europe, to publish 
the announcements as planned. The first warning, issued on 24 March 1945, 
threatened prosecution for anyone found to have acted upon Hitler’s infamous 
“commando order” of 18 October 1942, in which German military and security 
forces had been instructed to treat commando forces as illegal combatants and 
shoot them on sight. The policy had been known to the Allies since 1942, but 
was confirmed only in early March 1945 when an actual copy of the order fell 
into Allied hands. A second so-called “solemn warning” was published on 24 
April, and reminded camp guards of their individual responsibility for the safety 
of Allied POWs. A final communiqué, issued on 28 April, instructed the German 
authorities to cease moving western POWs around, and instead leave them “in 
situ” and permit them to be overrun by the advancing Allied forces. 
It is the JIC’s final set of recommendations—that involving the use of 
military force to protect POWs—that primarily concerns us here. The options for 
such activity included everything from battalion-strength airborne units, capable 
of seizing and securing “save-havens” for Allied POWs, to small reconnaissance 
teams, who could be inserted into individual camps or work-detachments. When 
first raised in the fall of 1944, the discussions had an inevitable air of unreality, 
as much would depend on the conditions at the moment of Germany’s collapse. 
Still, even at this stage, doubts were raised over whether the Allies would possess 
the necessary men, material, and aircraft to carry out operations on a grand scale 
or, indeed, whether the proposed measures would not aggravate tensions between 
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19. Bomber Command to Air Ministry, 8 November 1944; Minute by J. O. Balfour (Air 
Ministry), 14 November 1944, AIR2/5638, TNA.
20. Minute by N. Crockatt (MI9), 5 October 1944, WO32/11124, TNA.
21. A force of 200–250 bombers could “completely evacuate” a camp of 10,000 prisoners 
in three to four days using one aerodrome. Minute by J. O. Balfour (DB Ops Air Ministry), 14 
November 1944, AIR2/5638, TNA.
the POWs, their guards, and the local German forces and lead to precisely the 
massacre that they were meant to forestall. 
In London, the initial inclination was to err on side of caution. The Air 
Ministry welcomed the chance to play an “important part,” on the assumption 
that the cessation of hostilities would leave its bomber force with “little or nothing 
to do but kick their heels and get into trouble.” But the service chiefs were loath 
to tie the hands of the theatre commanders—Eisenhower in western Europe, and 
General Harold Alexander in the Mediterranean—by insisting that forces be 
retained from POW recovery operations.19 “Since the camps are numerous and 
widely dispersed and since many of the prisoners are not accommodated in camps 
at all,” the chiefs concluded in early September, it was unlikely that “airborne troops 
could assist in this way on a large scale.” Subsequent investigations into alternative 
options proved equally disappointing. The RAF was reluctant to countenance 
low-level fly-pasts of the camps either to intimidate the guards or “signal” Allied 
intentions to the prisoners.20 In sum, early British discussions concluded that the 
surest way of protecting POWs lay in the swift defeat of the German armed forces 
and the occupation and control of Germany. This was, of course, little more than 
a counsel of despair; most were confident that Germany’s field army could be 
destroyed, but no one could tell whether Allied forces would be able to establish 
the necessary control of German territory to prevent Nazi diehards executing 
Allied prisoners or seizing them as hostages.
The tenor of discussions in Washington was rather different. Here, officials 
proved more open to the idea of airborne operations. This was partly a matter of 
scale. Not only were there fewer U.S. POWs, 45,000 by late 1944, against some 
140,000 British, but of these, three-quarters were housed in just seven camps 
in Poland, all of which were conveniently situated near airfields. Preliminary 
investigations suggested that if regimental-size combat teams could provide 
“initial security” to each camp, a fleet of 400 heavy bombers could evacuate the 
men in as little as four or five days. Staff in Britain’s Air Ministry had made similar 
calculations, but had been deterred from pressing the case because of the number 
and dispersal of British prisoners.21 
If opinions diverged on the capacity for independent military action on behalf of 
the prisoners, a consensus did, nevertheless, emerge on two important issues. The first 
concerned the wisdom of supplying Allied prisoners with firearms. This option had 
been raised by the JIC in the summer, and had occasionally come up in communications 
with the camps and with those prisoners repatriated on health grounds over the 
course of 1944. The possibility of mobilizing prisoners had always exercised some 
appeal. In mid-1943, MI9 and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) had agreed 
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22. “MP” (SOE) to “AD/E” (SOE), 13 July 1943, HS6/637, TNA.
23. Curiously, the local Nazis apparently intended to wreak vengeance against only Ameri-
can prisoners, not their British counterparts. Roswell McClelland (US legation, Berne) to F. 
James (American Red Cross), 20 February 1945, Entry 7, Box 46, RG 311, NARA.
24. By January 1945, the Weidmennsdorf working camp near Klagenfurt had enough 
weapons and ammunition for all 270 men. Report by Lt. Col. Allan (MI9), 7 January 1945, 
Entry 7, Box 73, RG 331, NARA.
25. Report by Lt. Col. A. C. Allan (MI9), 5 January 1945; “MP” (SOE) to “AD/E” (SOE), 
13 July 1943, HS6/631 folio 130, TNA; Foot and Langley, MI9, 291–93.
26. Gen. Eisenhower (SHAEF) to Brig. Templar (War Office), 8 March 1945, Entry 1, 
Box 85, RG 331, NARA. The practical effect of this measure must be questioned given the 
widespread dispersal of POWs at that time. MI9 had had doubts over the military effectiveness 
of POWs since mid-1943. See “AD/E” to “MP, ” 24 July 1943, HS6/637 folio 129, TNA.
that British prisoners should join the resistance in the event of a general uprising in 
Poland. There was little chance of repatriating the men through organized channels, 
and the resistance might arrange for small parties to reach neutral Sweden.22 By mid-
1944, most camps holding Allied POWs had managed to acquire some arms and 
ammunition. At Oflag VII-C, Laufen, Wehrmacht officers in the camp administration 
even helped American prisoners smuggle in arms, as they feared the intentions of the 
local Nazi party and felt powerless to prevent a massacre on their own.23 In some cases, 
prisoners had managed to assemble sizeable arsenals, but in the main, the quantities of 
equipment were negligible.24 In the large Luftwaffe camp at Barth, for example, Allied 
airmen possessed just two revolvers and six spare rounds of ammunition.25 There were 
also serious doubts over the prisoners’ military value. With many British prisoners 
entering their fourth year of captivity, it was questionable whether they were fit to 
shoulder arms effectively. By early 1945 most planners felt that arming the prisoners 
would merely complicate the operations of regular or irregular units, and, most likely, 
precipitate the very violence that the measures were designed to waylay. As a matter of 
policy, therefore, the supply of arms to prisoners was discouraged. On 8 March 1945, 
General Eisenhower stipulated that no arms or sabotage materials were to be dropped 
within twenty-five miles of known POW camps to minimize the danger of prisoners 
becoming embroiled in the fighting.26
The second issue to be clarified over the discussions in late 1944 concerned the 
value of reinforcing the privileged status enjoyed by western POWs in German camps. 
Although the aerial bombing of German cities clearly strained German willingness 
to accord Allied airmen full protection under the Geneva convention, Allied planners 
were loath to discard this vital element of restraint on German guards and camp 
commandants. Allied airmen were increasingly singled out for special treatment, but 
by and large German civilians had refused to heed Goebbels’s call and greet every 
downed pilot with a pitch-fork. Most Allied pilots reached their camps in one piece, 
and once there, they remained under the authority of the Luftwaffe commandant. So 
long as the German authorities outwardly adhered to the international conventions, 
there was every value in underscoring the legal distinction between those who enjoyed 
protection under the Red Cross and POW conventions and those who did not. 
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27. For the “strong political pressure” on the Air Ministry to “make the most effective use 
of our air force to assist POWs,” see minute by Director of Policy (Air Ministry), 25 February 
1945, AIR2/5638, TNA. 
28. “MP” (SOE) to “AD/E” (SOE), 13 July 1943, HS6/637 folio 130, TNA. 
29. For SHAEF anxieties about French plans to foster a rebellion amongst its prisoners, 
see Minute by Brig. Venables (SHAEF), 19 November 1944, “French clandestine organizations,” 
Entry 7, Box 73, RG 331, NARA.
30. Archer and Dean to AGWAR for CCOS, 28 March 1945, Entry 27, Box 85, RG 331, 
NARA.
Such views naturally bolstered the argument for withholding the supply of 
weapons to the camps, as once armed a prisoner naturally lost his right to protection 
under the conventions. They also, though, strengthened the case for privileging 
western Allied POWs in any recovery plans. Internal correspondence suggests that 
it was a concern over the dissipation of Allied military resources that prompted 
planners to insist on distinguishing between POWs and foreign workers. Eisenhower 
was especially anxious lest public pressure force him to divert resources from the 
battlefront to tackle the humanitarian needs of Europe’s population.27 These worries 
were not shared by the French and Polish governments-in-exile, whose nationals 
were held as prisoners, civilian internees, guest-workers, and slave labourers. The 
French and Polish secret services had forged resistance and intelligence networks 
that paid little attention to neat legal categorizations, and deliberately used POW 
camps as communication hubs.28 Both governments envisaged their agents moving 
from intelligence gathering to sabotage and armed resistance in the final stages of 
the conflict. While they were ready to genuflect to Anglo-American sensitivities, in 
reality the two anticipated eroding the status of their POWs at precisely the time 
when western prisoners were most likely to be exposed to revenge attacks.29
Relations with the Soviets raised even more concerns. Soviet servicemen 
had been denied POW status since the start of the conflict, so none of the neat 
distinctions favored by the western governments had the slightest purchase on 
Soviet thinking. The sheer number and deplorable physical condition of Soviet 
prisoners in German hands by early 1945 made their recovery unattainable on 
the basis of current resources. More problematic still, though, was the prospect 
of prompting similar POW recovery operations by the Soviets. If the principle 
of inserting military units into Germany to protect foreign workers was accepted, 
there would be nothing to prevent Moscow from insisting on the insertion of 
sizeable Soviet military units into the western theatre of operations, or in the 
zones nominally ear-marked for western influence.30 
The British and Americans had good reasons, therefore, to keep their allies 
at arms’ length. U.S. officials were particularly wary of the French “Direction 
générale des études et recherches” (DGER), responsible for contacts with the 
French POWs, which they considered an “amateur outfit rocked by personal 
animosities and changes,” whose intelligence product was “of little value.” Nor were 
they keen to see talks progress on a tri-partite basis, since three-way relationships 
were “always very difficult” and left the Americans “in no position to compete 
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with such old veterans of intrigue as the various British Secret Services.”31 The 
British shared some of these misgivings, and agreed to “parley” with the French, 
sufficient, as one official put it, to “maintain a degree of control over them by 
bringing constant pressure to bear . . . and withholding equipment etc. for schemes 
of which we do not approve.”32 After a series of non-committal discussions in 
late 1944, the chief of staff for SHAEF, Lieutenant General W. B. Smith, bluntly 
informed French General Charles de Gaulle’s chief of general staff for national 
defense that it was “out of the bounds of possibility” for airborne forces to assist 
foreign “deportees” in the German Reich, and emphasized the “extremely small 
scale and inevitable tardiness of those measures of protection and relief that are 
in fact practicable.”33 To sweeten the blow, the British helped establish training 
schools for French agents, and put forty organizers and wireless operators through 
schools in England.34 SHAEF also dropped leaflets over Germany in November 
and December 1944, threatening retribution for anyone found ill-treating foreign 
workers.35 But French attempts to include “foreign workers” in Eisenhower’s 
“solemn warning” in late April 1945 were firmly rebuffed. Whatever the Allies 
were prepared to do for POWs at the war’s end, the principal focus was to be on 
British and American nationals: any benefit accrued by prisoners of the other 
Allies was purely incidental.
Thus, although POW recovery had emerged as a priority for western planners 
by late 1944, little headway had been made beyond securing agreement on a 
handful of basic principles. Events over the winter underscored the seriousness 
of the situation likely to face western—particularly—air force POWs in 
German hands as the war dragged on. Spurred on by Allied pronouncements 
about the “Trojan Horse” in Germany, the German authorities lost little time 
in tightening camp security arrangements. Red Cross food cans entering camps 
were punctured on arrival to prevent their use in escapes or by resistance forces, 
while the reserves of parcels held in British and American compounds were 
deliberately reduced from three months’ to one month’s supply, reversing the 
progress made in building up stocks over the previous twelve months, and 
leaving POWs vulnerable to delays in the parcel service in the final months of 
the war. Of even greater significance was the decision to evacuate camps in the 
east to avoid them being overrun by the Red Army. Evacuations began in mid-
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January 1945 and became a staple feature of the POW’s experience until the 
final days of the war. Apart from the appalling hardship endured underway and 
the increasing exposure to air attack and assaults from the civilian population, 
the evacuation led to chronic overcrowding and a deterioration in the sanitary 
and health conditions in the remaining camps in central Germany.36
Although not immediately apparent to western observers, the decision to 
evacuate prisoners was symptomatic of Hitler’s determination to maintain control 
of his “western hostages.” Even after the Anglo-Americans recovered the military 
initiative following the collapse of the German Ardennes offensive in early 
January 1945, it became increasingly clear that the “Eclipse” conditions, upon 
which so much planning had been founded, were unlikely to materialize. Far from 
capitulating, German military resistance became increasingly dogged as Allied 
forces edged their way into the German heartlands. “The further this campaign 
progresses,” Eisenhower admitted on 31 March, “the more probable it appears 
there will never be a clean cut military surrender.” 
Our experience to date is that even when formations as small as 
a division are disrupted, their fragments continue to fight until 
surrendered. All the areas in which fragments of the German 
Army, particularly the Paratrooper, Panzer and SS elements may be 
located, will have to be taken by the application of or the threat of 
force. This would lead into a form of guerilla warfare which would 
require for its suppression a very large number of troops.37
This was ominous for Allied POW recovery plans, for it left Allied assumptions 
about the “Eclipse” conditions—of a formal German surrender, the existence of a 
functioning German command, and the majority of POWs concentrated in camps 
awaiting instructions—in tatters.38 
The Military Option: Preparing Rescue Missions
Confusion over the likely timing and nature of Germany’s military collapse 
needs to be borne in mind in judging Allied military preparations for POW recovery 
over the final months of the war. The resumption of the Allies’ advance in early 
January 1945 focused attention on the issue, but it was only in the third week of 
February that the theatre commanders received their first official directive from the 
Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, and even here, particulars remained 
tantalizingly vague. SHAEF was instructed to prepare a “broad outline plan” for the 
dispatch of troops “by land or air,” capable of providing “maximum initial security” 
and the rapid evacuation of Allied prisoners. Priority was to be accorded to prisoners 
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captured “under U.S. and British command.” Still wedded to original thinking over 
“Eclipse” conditions, the chiefs called for forces to be deployable at the “earliest 
possible moment, consistent with deterioration of German resistance and evidence 
of impending surrender.”39 Despite almost six months of preliminary discussion, 
SHAEF’s planning staff appears to have been taken aback by the chiefs’ directive, 
for it took them nearly three weeks to decide on the basic nature and scope of the 
recovery operations, and another week to arrive at a coherent plan. The U.S. Tactical 
Army Air Force (USTAAF), the First Allied Airborne Army, and the Special Forces 
headquarters, who were approached in turn, declined to assume the lead on the 
grounds that they lacked the necessary administrative capacity or that their forces—
principally paratrooper units and Special Air Service (SAS) squadrons—were all 
earmarked for other tasks. Efforts to co-opt the secret services were likewise initially 
unsuccessful, as neither SOE nor its U.S. counterpart, the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS), was prepared to coordinate major ground or air operations, or take 
responsibility for any activity that might lead to a massacre of Allied prisoners.40 
Discussions were not helped by the fact that SHAEF officers were “still very vague 
in their own minds as to what was wanted.”41
The final plan, communicated to the chiefs on 26 March, amply reflected the 
haste and confusion in which it was conceived.42 The First Allied Airborne Army 
tentatively agreed to release battalion-strength airborne units for POW protection, 
though the scale of deployment would depend on the actual circumstances. 
SHAEF’s army group commanders were given the green light to dispatch relief 
columns to camps lying near their axis of advance, though Patton’s hapless bid 
to liberate Hammelburg camp on 25 March provided a timely reminder of the 
inherent risks of such operations. “Maximum initial security” could thus be 
assured for only a handful of the thirty-five camps believed to hold British and 
American POWs. Instead, SHAEF resigned itself to relying on the resources of 
the British and American secret services, which at best could provide only basic 
reconnaissance and communication facilities. The entire planning process paid 
little heed to the anticipated level of threat to Anglo-American prisoners, and 
amounted to a series of disjointed discussions between agencies that had only the 
slimmest idea of what they were ultimately being asked to do.43
Of the two secret agencies, it was the OSS that proved more enthusiastic 
about the task. Its chief, William Donovan, had been angling for such a role since 
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mid-December 1944, when news of the requirement first reached him. Whether 
Donovan’s interest reflected his personal commitment to POW recovery, or a greater 
confidence in the utility of military force than his British counterparts, is not known; 
what is clear, is that he had strong institutional interests at stake in securing OSS an 
active role in Germany’s final defeat. He had approached the president the previous 
September insisting on the importance of mounting aggressive subversion behind 
enemy lines; POW work offered a convenient entrée into this space.44 The OSS 
had already aided the recovery of American prisoners from Hungary, Romania, 
and Bulgaria, and this experience was clearly at the forefront of Donovan’s mind 
when he initially proposed a role for OSS in discussions with General Henry “Hap” 
Arnold, commanding general U.S. Army Air Forces, in December 1944.45
At this date, OSS had at its disposal several operation groups that had recently 
completed active operations in the Mediterranean, but by the time SHAEF 
returned to the matter in early February 1945, these forces had all been reassigned 
to other duties in Italy. One thirty-four-man “German” unit was available, but a 
third of the men could not speak German and possessed “no special qualifications 
whatsoever for getting along well in German occupied territory.”46 The only 
other groups to hand were fifty Norwegian teams, but all were committed during 
the February moon period to operations designed to impede the withdrawal of 
German forces from Norway. Neither the Norwegian- nor the Italian-based 
teams were keen to be diverted into speculative operations in Germany. Despite 
these difficulties, Donovan was clearly loathe to go back on his word, and over the 
course of February and early March, he browbeat his staff at Caserta and London 
into agreeing to commit to the enterprise and secure a suitably elevated position 
for OSS in any resultant Anglo-American organization. In Italy, a company was 
placed at the disposal of 15th Army Group and plans made to prepare all combat-
ready men for operations in northern Italy and Austria.47 In France, meanwhile, 
sixty German operation groups were pledged in early March with a promise to 
withdraw some of the Norwegian groups if required.48 
By contrast, Donovan’s British counterparts were, from the outset, reluctant to 
support an activity that was “scarcely its business.” SOE continued to take the line that 
it had “no role to play in the matter” until its hand was forced in early March.49 Its 
hesitation partly reflected the pressure of other priorities—not least in the Far East—
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but partly too, its experience in mounting operations deep behind enemy lines. Doubts 
over the strength of the German resistance movement—especially after the July 1944 
bomb-plot—and of the chances of operating in the absence of local reception parties, 
meant that discussion on running Anglo-American teams into Germany petered 
out in the summer of 1944, never to return. SOE’s council designated Germany as 
its primary target in early August, but in truth SOE had neither the plans nor the 
appetite to infiltrate agents into the Reich, and remained “obstinately skeptical” of 
any organized activity inside Germany. Preference, instead, was given to “mobilizing” 
foreign workers and German prisoners in Allied hands and preparing the ground 
for operations “during the post-armistice period.”50 SOE’s sister service, the Secret 
Intelligence Service, also struggled to make much headway in penetrating the Reich; 
by late 1944 the life-expectancy of agents infiltrated into Germany was barely three 
weeks.51 British officials did not, therefore, view the prospect of parachuting teams 
behind German lines with much enthusiasm. They were also wary of assuming 
responsibility for any operations closely associated with military developments on 
the ground. SHAEF’s initial suggestion that an integrated command organization sit 
alongside Special Forces headquarters was, in the words of the SOE official sent to 
discuss the matter, “simply not on,” as such an organization was thought incapable of 
dealing with complex operations subject to “hourly alterations and improvisations.”52 
It was not until full operational control was accepted by SHAEF in March—in the 
form of a dedicated “PWX” staff attached to forward SHAEF headquarters—that 
SOE finally agreed to “father the project” and raise and equip the necessary force.53 
A Forlorn Hope? Rescue Operations in Germany and Austria, April–May 1945
The training and composition of the force hastily assembled to meet 
SHAEF’s requirements in early April, the Special Allied Air Reconnaissance 
Force (SAARF), naturally reflected SOE’s approach to clandestine operations. 
Personnel were divided into three-man units, similar to the “Jedburgh” teams 
dropped into France before D-Day.54 Although they were supplied with small 
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arms, their job was not to “protect” the prisoners. Instead they were to parachute 
into Germany, locate the whereabouts of Allied POWs, establish their needs, 
evaluate the attitude of the local authorities, and act as go-betweens for the 
prisoners, the camp authorities, and the advancing Allied units.55 A training 
base was established at Wentworth Golf Club at Virginia Water, outside 
London, to deliver a syllabus covering field craft, patrol and reconnaissance, 
map reading, coding and encoding, driving German vehicles, first aid, use of 
standard German small-arms, unarmed combat, and German phrases. Teams 
also tested their skills off-campus, establishing radio contact with Wentworth 
before attempting to reach, undetected, British military establishments.56 About 
a third of the personnel were recruited from the ranks of British, American, 
French, Norwegian, and Belgian special forces, for whom the camp inevitably 
had something of a “ritualistic” character. “Few of us,” recalled one SOE veteran, 
“were prepared to take all this training too seriously; and many of us found 
excuses to be absent from Wentworth, for we all had better things to do.”57 
Paratroopers from the First Allied Airborne Army provided the majority of U.S. 
personnel and a third of the British, while the remainder were drawn from the 
regular services and selected for their particular language or local knowledge.58
The rapidity of the Allied advance from early April—belying Eisenhower’s 
predictions—meant that by the time large numbers of Allied prisoners began to 
be uncovered by Allied forces, SAARF had only 18 teams ready; the majority were 
not expected to have completed full training until early May.59 Nevertheless, the 
crumbling of German resistance transformed SAARF’s task. With camps and 
work-detachments being overrun on a daily basis, the need to drop units behind 
German lines declined. Instead, from 17 April, the majority of SAARF teams 
were provided with jeeps, and dispatched to newly liberated camps to provide 
assessments on the prisoners’ immediate material and medical needs and distribute 
consignments of some of the 17 million ration packs assembled for the purpose.60 
Eight Belgian units were deployed in a similar capacity to assist famine victims in 
the remaining pockets of German-occupied Belgium, while a handful of the teams 
were diverted to German concentration camps to search for Allied agents. Of the 
120 teams designated for SAARF training, 74 were ultimately used (25 British, 
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13 American, 16 French, 11 Belgian, and 6 Polish) and distributed amongst the 
forward units of the British 21st and the U.S. 6th and 12th army groups.61 
On only two occasions were recovery units deployed as initially intended. 
Six teams (two British, two American, and two French) were airlifted to Stalag 
XI Altengrabau, east of Magdeburg, on 24 April, while a four-man British team 
from Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED) “A Force” was 
dispatched to Stalag XXVIII/A Wolfsberg, near Klagenfurt in Austria, on 8 
May.62 Interestingly, the recollections of those involved are uniformly disparaging 
about their duties. Major Philip Worrall considered his operation to Altengrabau 
a “deluxe unrealistic operation”; one of his colleagues described it as “completely 
crackers.” Jock McKee, who led the team to Wolfsberg, thought the entire affair 
“really no rescue at all but merely a provocation to the nastier elements of the 
German Army. I was very much against [this ‘forlorn hope’], for I did not want to 
get killed for bugger all and I saw no value in it, as the British 5th corps was rapidly 
advancing into southern Austria.”63 In fact, although the Altengrabau operation 
did see fatalities—one French team disappeared without a trace—SHAEF’s war 
diary rated Worrall’s operation to Altengrabau as “extremely successful”; routine 
reports were sent direct to London and the White House, and in both cases, the 
operations led to the safe recovery of Allied prisoners.64 
In the fluid situation in Germany and Austria at this stage of the war, it was 
perhaps only to be expected that the operations would depend on luck as much 
as good planning or judgment. The teams that negotiated the prisoners’ release at 
Altengrabau were all initially apprehended and detained in the very camp they 
had set out to liberate. Yet, in both cases, the rationale for casting fortune to the 
wind was strong. Wolfsberg was believed to contain over 10,000 British prisoners 
at the start of the year, double the number held at any other camp in Austria, while 
Altengrabau was, by mid-April, the central concentration point for three large 
Stalags to the east (IIIA, Luckenwald; IIIB, Furstenburg; and IIIC, Alt Drzewice) 
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whose combined population exceeded 150,000. By 24 April the camp lay only 
twenty-three miles from the U.S. front line, but news that a party of senior Allied 
POWs—known as the Prominenten—were being whisked into Hitler’s Alpine 
Redoubt prompted the Allies to redouble their recovery operations and publicize 
the “solemn warning” to German guards over the evening of 24–25 April.65 In 
little more than a fortnight, however, Worrall was able to persuade Altengrabau’s 
commandant to relinquish authority, arrange for an airdrop of food and medical 
supplies, and negotiate for U.S. trucks to pass through German lines to evacuate 
the 2,000 British and American POWs, plus smaller numbers of Belgians, French, 
Dutch, and Serbs. Some 1,000 Polish and 9,000 Soviet POWs were handed over to 
units of the Soviet army.66 McKee’s experience at Wolfsberg was similar. Landing 
in front of the perimeter fence, he was immediately surrounded by jubilant 
prisoners who had already effectively taken control of the camp. Before he could 
secure their safe repatriation, though, McKee had to talk an SS battalion into 
relinquishing its weapons, and dodge the bullets of local partisans who ambushed 
him on route to a rendezvous with British forces at Klagenfurt.67 In both cases, 
the SAARF teams had to overcome the suspicions of the Russians, whose units 
reached the camps before the evacuations were complete, and whose record of 
treatment of Allied special forces was far from generous. One of the teams sent to 
Altengrabau was detained by Soviet forces for four days, and returned to western 
lines only after they broke out of Soviet custody.68 
Conclusion: The Impact and Legacy of POW Rescue Operations
Historians have tended to echo the views of contemporaries in evaluating 
the Allied POW recovery operations. According to Arieh Kochavi, the Allied 
governments “stood by almost completely helpless” as their exhausted prisoners 
bid to survive the final days of Hitler’s Reich, an event that Tony Rennell and John 
Nichol depict as the prisoners’ “last escape.”69 That the vast majority of British and 
American prisoners survived this ordeal, and that Nazi extremists did not indulge 
in an orgy of violence, ultimately had little to do with Allied public warnings 
or military operations. Yet to argue that the Allies “decided against taking any 
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direct and overt action on behalf of their men” overlooks the substantial relief 
operations carried out by the Allied land and air forces, and the political and 
resource constraints on Allied options.70 There is no question that the Allied 
military and civilian leadership took the threat against their men seriously, and 
felt both morally and politically compelled to take steps to reduce this danger. 
The Americans showed the greater propensity for military action, demonstrating, 
perhaps, an early manifestation of the commitment to POW recovery that so 
marked later U.S. military outlook. The archives do not indicate whether this 
commitment reflected a specially heightened level of sensitivity towards the fate 
of their captured servicemen, but the fact that British policy makers had spent 
four years resisting German intimidation over POW treatment may well have 
hardened attitudes towards the dangers facing their men in the “Eclipse” period.71 
Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that American enthusiasm for 
military options lay in part in the potential for mounting rescue missions when 
the issue was first raised in mid-1944, and the particular attraction that POW 
Disbandment review of Special Allied Air Reconnaissance Force (SAARF), Wentworth, 
England, circa 23 June 1945. The review was conducted by the Commander of the Aldershot 
Military District; behind him, with cuffs rolled up, is Brigadier J. S. Nichols, the Commanding 
Officer of SAARF; and to his left is the Deputy Commander, Colonel J. E. Raymond (U.S. 
Army). [Image courtesy of Mr. Les Hughes]
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recovery operations held for Donovan’s OSS as the war entered its final phase. 
While Allied counter-measures were far from comprehensive, what ultimately 
confounded their plans was the development of events on the ground, not the 
lack of imagination or conviction. The possibilities of deploying military forces 
diminished as the hope of inflicting a decisive battlefield defeat on the German 
army ebbed. It was clear, by late March 1945, that the Allied armies would need 
to extinguish every last ember of German resistance. The dangers of mounting 
large-scale rescue missions in this environment remained high, as Patton’s foray 
to Hammelburg showed only too well. Allied resources would therefore need to 
be deployed flexibly; adaptability would be decisive. Nothing better illustrates this 
than the fact that liberated prisoners first arrived in southern England on 3 April, 
the same day Wentworth opened its doors to SAARF recruits and only five weeks 
before Germany’s final capitulation.
Allied recovery operations were ultimately destined to supplement the 
activities of their ground forces and relief agencies, rather than supplant them. 
They were also designed to complement the work of those other bodies working 
to restrain German behavior in the final days of the war. SAARF’s modus 
operandi was, in this respect, strikingly similar to the work undertaken by Swiss 
diplomats and Red Cross officials who were dispatched to the principal camps 
holding British and American POWs and who frequently interceded with the 
German authorities to halt camp evacuations and negotiate the safe transfer of 
prisoners across the battle lines. In early February 1945, Allied officials even tried 
to convince the International Committee of the Red Cross to equip its delegates 
with two-way radios for use in communicating with advancing Allied units. The 
suggestion was politely turned down, but in its essence the concept differed little 
from that adopted by the SAARF teams two months later.72  
The recourse to special forces for the POW recovery role is also noteworthy, 
given the use of specialist units in this capacity during the Cold War and beyond. 
Set against the battle-honors won by Allied secret agencies over the course of the 
war, it is hardly surprising that SAARF does not loom large in their histories; 
this was even so in the OSS, whose staff laid greater store on the operations than 
their British counterpart. As one SAARF veteran, James Hutchison, admitted, 
“no one will claim that SAARF played a dazzling, outstanding or war-winning 
part.”73 Still, Allied operations on behalf of POWs in 1945 are significant. The 
success in recruiting, training, and deploying teams on these missions supports 
recent research findings that emphasize the versatility of the Allied secret 
agencies by this stage of the war.74 SOE added POW recovery expertise to 
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an impressive list of skills that extended well beyond “setting Europe ablaze” 
and included mobilizing guerrilla forces, fomenting political unrest, carrying 
out industrial sabotage, manipulating currencies, and waging economic warfare. 
Moreover, it acquired this new skill-set in a remarkably short space of time. As 
Hutchison again notes, “three years earlier (in the Middle East for instance) it 
would have taken a year at least to create what was now extemporized efficiently 
in a month.”75 It is perhaps not surprising that SAARF’s commanding officer 
claimed that the unit’s leit motif was its “sense of extreme urgency”76
Finally, although the 20,000 POWs “recovered” from Altengrabau and 
Wolfsberg were a fraction of those whose lives hung in the balance in April–May 
1945, the real significance of these rescues probably lay beyond Europe’s shores. 
It should not be forgotten that the previous attempt to recover POWs in any 
number—in Italy in 1943—had been a disaster. What the experience in Germany 
in 1945 gave Allied planners was not just the chance to learn from their earlier 
mistakes and develop the technical wherewithal to plan and mount successful 
relief and recovery operations; it gave them confidence to carry this experience into 
the Pacific theatre. Here too, the pace of events confounded expectations, but the 
practical obstacles to prisoner recovery (the wide dispersal and appalling physical 
condition of Allied prisoners) dwarfed even those encountered in Europe. The safe 
return of prisoners from Germany thus provided a template and skill-set that were 
translated into the activities of South East Asia Command’s RAPWI organization 
(Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees), which began its operations in 
earnest in early August 1945. It also created an important precedent. In reluctantly 
agreeing to “father” SAARF, the head of SOE, Sir Colin Gubbins, admitted that 
although he had “no particular wish to undertake [the task],” he could not ignore the 
“moral responsibility to do all we can to help.”77 This sense of moral responsibility 
bore heavily on those involved in POW recovery operations and set the bar that 
western governments and their militaries have felt obliged to meet ever since.
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